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Abstract—Online social media applications have become an
integral part of our everyday life. Not only are they being
utilised by individuals and legitimate businesses, but also
recently several organised groups, such as activists, hactivists,
and cyber-criminals have adopted them to communicate and
spread their ideas. This represents a new source for intelligence
gathering for law enforcement for instance, as it allows them an
inside look at the behaviour of these previously closed, secretive
groups. One possible opportunity with this online data source
is to utilise the public exchange of social-media messages to
identify key users in such groups. This is particularly important
for law enforcement that wants to monitor or interrogate
influential people in suspicious groups. In this paper, we utilise
Social Network Analysis (SNA) techniques to understand the
dynamics of the interaction between users in a Facebook-
based activist group. Additionally, we aim to identify the
most influential users in the group and infer their relationship
strength. We incorporate sentiment analysis to identify users
with clear positive and negative influences on the group; this
could aid in facilitating a better understanding of the group. We
also perform a temporal analysis to correlate online activities
with relevant real-life events. Our results show that applying
such data analysis techniques on users online behaviour is a
powerful tool to predict levels of influence and relationship
strength between group members. Finally, we validated our
results against the ground truth and found that our approach
is very promising at achieving its aims.
Keywords-Social Network Analysis; Influential Users; Cyber
Security; Sentiment Analysis, Online Social Networks;
I. INTRODUCTION
The popularity of online social networks (OSNs) has
signiﬁcantly increased in the last decade. Individual people,
businesses, and news agencies use OSNs such as Twitter
and Facebook to discuss topics, promote and advertise
services, spread news and political views. Over the last few
years, several organised groups including terrorists, activists,
hacktivists have been utilising OSNs to communicate their
ideas, plan or brag about crimes, and distribute messages [1].
According to experts in the criminology ﬁeld, the existence
of organised cyber-criminals in the online world is growing
rapidly [2]. Although the use of online social services pro-
vide these organised groups with a medium to communicate
and voice their views, it also provides law enforcement and
the research community with a window into their world to
better understand the behaviour of these communities.
Social Network Analysis (SNA) is a method used to inves-
tigate social structures by utilising graph theory concepts [3],
[4]. SNA techniques have proven to be particularly useful
in studying and analysing the structure and behaviour of
social groups [5]. SNA is typically used to study real-world
networks, either using static techniques that analyse the
structural properties of the network and/or using dynamic
techniques that use statistical methods to model different
network processes over time. Furthermore, using SNA met-
rics such as centrality measures [6] provide insights into the
community structure and key players within a network.
The aim of this paper is to investigate SNA metrics that
can aid in identifying key players within a given organised
group, mainly of activists. National and international activist
groups often use web forums to promote movements and
distribute propaganda materials. Although some of these
activist groups organise peaceful activities, some escalate
to hostile movements which may cause disruption and
ﬁnancial losses to targeted organisations. The identiﬁcation
of key players in a given organised group of interest can
help authorities save resources spent on investigating the
whole network especially when the network is huge and
complex [7]. Additionally, this can serve as a proactive
measure to predict the occurrence of any potentially dis-
ruptive ofﬂine action. For instance, last year the Australia
and New Zealand Banking Group (ANZ) head ofﬁce was
in lock-down as around 80 people aggressively protest the
bank’s funding of fossil fuel projects [8]. Another example
is when two activists who broke into a coal mine and
scaled equipment, obstructed the work of mining equipment
resulting in ﬁnancial losses [9].
Much of the existing efforts that aim to identify key
individuals within organised criminal groups rely on a single
type of analysis such as SNA metrics, or text mining.
Relying on a single method may fail to identify all inﬂuential
people as well as it can misidentify them as inﬂuential while
they are not (false positives). Therefore, a hybrid approach
that combines several analysis techniques to identify key
inﬂuential individuals will give more accurate and reliable
results. In this paper, we perform an empirical study to
identify key players within activist groups in the Facebook
OSN. When analysing key players we must make the
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distinction between the most active member of the group
and the most inﬂuential. A user who is the most active
in an OSN group in terms of posting activities, is not
necessarily the most inﬂuential on the group. Our goal is to
investigate the inference of such inﬂuential actors in real life
through their social network interactions. Additionally, we
intend to identify key players in suspicious activist networks
(both most active and most inﬂuential) where targeting these
individuals may (1) result in destruction of the network,
and (2) aid in collecting intelligence about the network and
mediating the ﬂow of information.
Furthermore, after identifying the most inﬂuential individ-
uals we utilise sentiment analysis on posts and comments to
identify whether the identiﬁed individual has a mainly posi-
tive or negative inﬂuence on the group. Thus, we identify key
players that can potentially persuade the majority to accept
or refuse a given proposition. Furthermore, we initially study
how the group evolves and grows over time by performing
time analysis to study when and why the group activity level
increases or decreases. We correlate the observed trends
with related real-world events and try to identify patterns
in ofﬂine and online behaviour. These additional analysis
techniques will aid in gaining useful group insights.
The main contributions of our work are summarised as
follows:
• Understand the dynamics of the interactions in poten-
tially suspicious activist networks.
• Apply SNA techniques to identify the key players in
organised activist groups. This includes the most active
and most inﬂuential.
• Inference of trust relations between actor pairs within
a social network, based on structural properties and
sentiment analysis information to gain further group
insights.
• Perform a temporal analysis of the network posting
structure and compare it over time. In addition, we
investigate the correlation of the amount of online
activity with related real-world events.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows:
Section II provides a brief background and review of related
work. Section III and Section IV describe the methodology
we follow and introduce the dataset used in our research.
Section V details the analysis that we conducted followed
by a validation and discussion of the results in Section VI.
Finally, we conclude this paper in Section VII, and present
ideas for future work.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Previous research has stressed the need to identify key
players within different organised groups. Mainly, the focus
has been on criminal groups such as drug dealers, and
terrorists with the aim to understand the structure of these
groups to be able to effectively disrupt their behaviour and
help law enforcement capture them [10]–[13]. There are two
main streams of research in criminal network literature. The
ﬁrst is the study of the main enablers of link-formation, in
other words, what motivates individuals to form or break
links [2]. Some of these studies suggest that prison for
instance might be one of these enablers as people who spent
prison time together are more likely to form a link in the
future and commit a crime [14]. Others suggest that similar
individual attributes such as age, race, and religion are key
in forming links and co-offending [15]. The second stream
is about utilising statistical methods and social network
analysis to measure these networks, identify key individuals,
and measure tie strength between them.
Social Network Analysis (SNA) can be used to iden-
tify key nodes in the network using multiple centrality
measures [4]. One of the most used measures is degree
centrality, which measures the number of direct neighbours
connected to a given node. Thus, the higher the degree
centrality the more critical this node is to the network
as it could represent a hub for information and resource
ﬂowing within the network. Networks with a few centralised
hubs are commonly referred to as centralised networks.
Launching a random attack on such networks in an attempt
to disrupt their behaviour will most likely result in targeting
exterior nodes, and thus not having a signiﬁcant impact
on the network. However, targeting the identiﬁed hubs is
likely to have signiﬁcant impact and will disconnect the
network, which could result in an effective disruption of,
for instance, a criminal group’s activities. Another important
centrality measure is betweenness centrality, which measures
the number of shortest paths that pass through a given node.
This measures the indirect contacts that surround a particular
node, which gives an indication of the importance of this
node for the information ﬂow in the network. These are
examples of measures that can be useful in achieving our
aims to identify key players in a given network of interest.
Borgatti argues that in order to effectively measure cen-
trality, one should have an understanding of why centrality
is important [16]. He distinguishes between two different
reasons to measure centrality and identify key players in
a network. The ﬁrst reason is to maximize disruption to
a given network, while the second reason is to maximize
collection of information. Additionally, Borgatti recognises
that typically effective targeting of central nodes is often
done on multiple nodes in the network rather than a single
central node. One limitation of Borgatti’s model is that
it does not incorporate weights for nodes nor links when
measuring centrality. This was identiﬁed by Schwartz et
al. [11] and they built on it and incorporate both node
weights and link weights into Borgatti’s approach.
SNA techniques have been utilised to understand and
disrupt several organised groups and networks such as ter-
rorists, arm dealers, drug smuggling, and wildlife trafﬁcking
networks [12]. Several data sources are used to construct the
criminal network. Examples include intelligence from law
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enforcement, police arrest reports, and courts sentencing.
Bright et. al., used judges’ sentencing comments to conduct
SNA in order to understand criminal networks in Australia.
The aim of their study was to examine whether SNA based
on judges’ sentencing comments can provide insights into
the structure and operation of Australia’s methamphetamin
market [10]. Furthermore, L’Huillier et al. used SNA tech-
niques in addition to text mining in order to identify key-
members in virtual communities of interests, where members
share common interest in particular topic [17]. Another im-
portant research track that aids in identifying key inﬂuential
individuals within organised groups is tie strength. This
concept was ﬁrst presented by Granovetter when he dis-
cussed the strength of weak ties [18]. Following this, other
work in the literature focused on incorporating his theory
to study and predict tie strength between users in social
networks [19]. This is particularly important when analysing
organised groups to identify trust relations between pairs of
users and identify the strong ties connected to the key players
in a given network.
Prior studies have put forward several initiatives to iden-
tify key individuals and group leaders [11], [20], [21].
Some used SNA metrics and algorithms, such as centrality
measures and Page Rank algorithm [22], while others used
text mining techniques [23]. However, few studies tried to
combine several techniques to identify key and inﬂuential
members in suspicious groups [24]. In our study, we adopt a
hybrid approach as we utilise several SNA metrics to identify
key players in the group, then we perform text sentiment
analysis and temporal analysis to gain further insights.
III. METHODOLOGY
In order to identify key players in a given social group,
several SNA metrics can be utilised. In graph theory, cen-
trality measures identify the most important vertices in a
graph [6]. The simplest and most obvious centrality measure
that can help identify the most important node in a graph
is Degree Centrality (DegCent) [12]. As mentioned earlier,
DegCent measures the number of direct links a given node
has. The higher the DegCent of a node, the more connected
the node is in the network. While DegCent focuses on the
number of direct connections a node has, it does not consider
the global localization the node has in the network and does
not take in consideration how powerful those connections are
in the graph. Thus, another centrality measure that focuses
on the inﬂuence of the connected nodes is Eigenvector
Centrality (EigenCent). EigenCent concentrates more on
identifying the most connected intermediary [25]. A node
that has a high eigenvector score is one that is adjacent to
nodes that themselves have high scores [6]. Additionally,
Betweenness Centrality (BetCent) is a measure that indicates
the intermediary with the most control over information ﬂow.
In our empirical study, we apply these centrality measures
to an activist dataset to identify the most connected, and
inﬂuential users in each activist social group. We summarise
our methodology as follows:
1) Pre-process the data in order to create different graphs,
such as a bipartite graph for users and their created
posts, and a directed user-to-user relation graph.
2) Apply SNA techniques to the data to identify the most
important and inﬂuential users in the network based
on the different centrality metrics.
3) Use sentiment analysis on users’ posts and comments
and assign to each post either a positive or negative
value. Then we label each user as having a negative or
positive inﬂuence on the group based on the average
sentiment of all their posts.
4) Apply clustering algorithms to identify potentially
hidden communities within the larger network dataset.
5) Perform analysis of the network posting structure over
time and correlate observed trends with related real-
world events.
IV. ONLINE ACTIVIST DATASET
The online activist dataset that was used for our study
consists of Facebook posts from a UK-based activist group
in the Facebook online social network. For ethical reasons
we are not able to mention the group’s name but will
refer to it as FB-Activist Group (FB-AG). The group is
mainly focused on sharing information related to their cause,
promoting for several movements and organising protests.
The FB-AG dataset incorporates 670 Facebook group posts
posted by 274 users. These posts include 370 original posts
and 300 comments on those posts. Note that our dataset did
not contain any replies to comments on original posts. For
each post, we have access to the number of likes, number
of comments, and number of shares each post received.
Additionally, the posts are time-stamped which allows us to
reconstruct the time line of the posts. Moreover, the dataset
contains generic information about the users who created
each post. This information includes, user ID, age, gender,
and location. The dataset was collected from the period of
March to May, 2015.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE FACEBOOK ACTIVIST GROUP
A. Social Network Analysis
1) Research Questions: Before we demonstrate how we
apply SNA metrics to identify key players in the network,
we provide the research questions that we aim to answer in
our analysis:
1) By analysing the network, can we identify the most
active, and most inﬂuential user(s)? Are they the
same?
2) Can we identify sub-communities within the network,
and predict tie strength between members?
3) How does the network grow over time? Is it getting












































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1. The Facebook-AG Comments Network. In this network, the node size represents the nodes’ degree centrality measure and the nodes’ colour
represents the detected communities or clusters. Edge thickness represents the frequency of communication between nodes and the arrows represent the
direction of communication. Here the number of nodes (N) is 274 and number of edges (E) is 162.
To be able to answer the above questions, we construct
different graphs from the FB-AG dataset. First, we generate
a user-to-user relationship graph. In this graph we say there
is a relation between two users if one of them comments on
the other’s post. Formally, we deﬁne the graph as a directed
weighted graph G = (U,E), where U represent the users
who initiated a comment action, and E represent the edges
set. An edge e exist between two user nodes A and B, if user
A comments on a post published by user B. The edge weight
w represents the frequency of interaction between the two
users. We will refer to this graph as the Comments Network
and it is shown in Figure 1.
2) Applying SNA Metrics: In order to analyse the topol-
ogy of the Comments Network we ﬁrst introduce a number
of key SNA metrics. The ﬁve most important measures for
network topology are [26]:
Centrality: As described in Section II, there are several
centrality measures and each gives a different interpretation
to the network. We apply the following centrality measures:
Degree centrality (DegCent), to identify how many people
this user can reach directly; Betweenness centrality (Bet-
Cent), to identify how likely this user is to be the most
direct route between two other users; Eigenvector centrality
(EigenCent), to measure how well this user is connected to
other well connected users.
Network Density: This is deﬁned as total number of
actual connections in the network divided by total number
of possible connections. This measure provides insight into
how effective information spreads among the network users.
In the Comments Network, the network density is 0.002,
which is considered low. This suggests that information does
not spread effectively in the activist group as peripheral
nodes depend on their connection to other central nodes to
receive information.
Average Degree: This measures the number of average
connections a node has in the network. Again the average
degree for a node in the Comments Network equals to 1,
which is considered quite low as the network consist of
274 users. This suggests that only few users have high
degree measure and many users comment on their posts.
This matches our previous observation that users in the
activist group are not well connected to each other.
Average Path Length: This is the average value of the
number of shortest paths between all pairs of nodes. This
measure represents the average number of steps it takes
to get from one node in the network to another. For the
Comments Network, on average indirectly connected users
can reach each other in around 2 steps. This means that
information can spread in the network fairly quickly if it
goes through one of the hubs in the network.
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Network Diameter: This is the longest of all the calculated
shortest paths in the network. In the Comments Network,
the diameter equals to 5. In other words, within the FB-AG
network the longest distance it takes for information to ﬂow
between two users in the network is 5 hops.
Table I
SUMMARY OF COMMENTS NETWORK TOPOLOGY MEASURES
Measures Values
Number of Nodes 274
Number of Edges 162
Average Degree Centrality 1.000
Average Path Length 2.012
Density 0.002
Diameter 5
Number of weakly connected components 123
Number of strongly connected components 274
Modularity 0.774
Number of communities 131
We apply each of these measures on the Comments
Network and summarise the results in Table I. The network
is visualised in Figure 1, where the nodes’ colours represent
the detected communities in the graph. We used a modularity
algorithm [27] to measure the network modularity and
partition the network into communities. Additionally, the
nodes’ size represent the DegCent measure. The bigger the
node the more active the associated user is in the network.
The edge thickness represents the frequency of interaction
between any given two nodes. Moreover, the Comments
Network shows that there are a number of isolated nodes
without any incoming or outgoing edges. This represents
users who have created posts in the Facebook group but did
not receive any comments on them. Similarly, those users
did not engage in any discussion in the group since they do
not have any outgoing edges.
Furthermore, we can see from the graph that there are
several communities of small size (two nodes). Clearly,
those small disconnected communities are not relevant to
our analysis of inﬂuential users therefore we ﬁlter them out
to get the more concise graph presented in Figure 2. It is
this graph that we use for further analysis.
Identifying Influential Users – Previous research has
identiﬁed that network robustness may depend among other
factors on high degree nodes (i.e., hubs) [28]. Targeting
those hubs will lead to the destruction of the network
into sub-networks, thus, losing its power and effectiveness.
This is true if the network is scalefree. This means that if
the network degree distribution follows a power law, then
identifying hubs in the network will aid in interrupting
the ﬂow of information and destroy the network [13]. We
measure the network degree distribution of the Comments
Network and ﬁnd that it follows a power law distribution
























































































































































































Figure 2. Facebook-AG Filtered Comments Network. The nodes size
represent the betweenness centrality measure.
In the context of our study of activist groups, this means that
if we aim to disrupt the ﬂow of information in the Comments
Network, we would target nodes with high degree centrality.
For example, isolating the users with the highest DegCent
would most likely result in preventing the activist group from
organising large protests.
Figure 3. Facebook-AG Comments Network Degree Distribution.
We can see in Figure 2 that FB-AG network consist of
four disconnected components of varying sizes. The largest
component (located in the right side of the graph) has two
main central nodes (User 33, and User 74). These two nodes
have the highest DegCent and BetCent measures in the entire
network. It is interesting though, that these two hubs do not
have any direct links to each other. They are only connected
through indirect links. One explanation for this is that the
two users are the leaders of the activist group each within
their own small community. Both have the responsibility to
spread messages and answer members questions, which does
not require them to comment on each other’s posts.
When using SNA metrics, it is important to combine
different measures to be able to draw conclusions about
the network [29]. Moreover, based on the nature of these
groups we assume that there are additional inﬂuential people
hidden within the network. To discover these individuals, we
apply additional SNA metrics to the network. EigenCent is
an important measure that can identify how well a user is
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connected to other highly connected people (See Figure 4).
This measure reveals that User 32 has the highest eigenvec-
tor centrality value followed by User 213. This shows that
both of them have a powerful position in the network as
they are mainly connected to other well connected users. In
other words, User 32 and User 213 have a strong relation
























































































































Figure 4. Facebook-AG Comments Network- Nodes size represent the
nodes Eigenvector Centrality
Moreover, additional interesting metrics that revealed
more insights to identify inﬂuential users in the network are
PageRank scores [30] and HITS Authorities and Hubs [31].
By applying the PageRank algorithm to our network the
following users scored the highest: User 74, User 33, User
165, and User 156. The ﬁrst two users are expected to
show up in the top score list as they have the highest
DegCent in the network. However, another two users were
identiﬁed by PageRank algorithm as highly important users.
The importance of applying PageRank algorithm is that
it takes in consideration not only the quantity of links
between nodes (like DegCent), but also the links’ qualities.
Furthermore, the HITS authority score showed that User 74
and User 33 are the most authoritative in the network (many
users commenting on their posts), while the HITS hub scores
showed that User 74 and User 209 are the top hubs (they
comment heavily on other users’ posts). Table II summarises
the top three ranked users for each SNA measure.
Table II
TOP 3 INFLUENTIAL USERS IN DIFFERENT SNA METRICS.
Metric First Rank Second Rank Third Rank
Betweenness Centrality User 33 User 74 User 209
Eigenvector Centrality User 32 User 213 User 74
PageRank User 74 User 33 User 32
HITS - Authority User 74 User 33 User 32
HITS - Hub User 74 User 209 User 234
From the table it is clear that User 74 has the highest
inﬂuence in the network followed by User 33. Moreover,
User 32 and User 209 seem to have important role in the
network. For instance, User 32 scored highest in EigenCent
and third in PageRank and Authority. He has a strong tie
with User 33 which is realised by the high number of
comments from User 33 to User 32. Additionally, he has
a tie with User 74 although it is not as strong as the
other one. On the other hand, looking at User 209 position
in the graph, we can see that the user acts as a middle
connection point between the two most inﬂuential users
(User 33 and User 74). Similarly, based on the community
detection algorithm, User 209 is the linking node between
three different communities which makes him a critical
node for the spread of information within those different
communities. This information can be useful for authorities
who aims to disrupt the activist group network by targeting
a minimum number of users.
Analysing Tie Strength – To be able to analyse and
predict tie strength between users in the activist group we
rely on several variables. The most intuitive and obvious
tie strength variable is the frequency of interaction between
the linked users. If two users constantly comment on each
other’s posts we might assume that they have a strong
relation. Identifying tie strength between users is particularly
important as it provides insight into the social structure of
the activist group. In most social groups, users who have
strong relations with leaders of the group are considered
inﬂuential themselves. Thus, identifying strong ties can aid
in identifying key inﬂuential members of the group.
There is a number of SNA measures that can aid in better
understanding relations between nodes and the level of trust
between them. One of these measures is neighbourhood
overlap, which is deﬁned as a ratio as follows [32]:
The neighbourhood overlap of an edge (A,B) is:
number of nodes adjacent to both A and B
number of nodes adjacent to at least one of A or B
Neighborhood overlap measures closeness to being a local
bridge. The numerator in the above deﬁnition of neighbour-
hood overlap represent another important measure called
edge embeddedness. Both of these measures are considered
an indication of the level of trust in the relation between A
and B [32]. Moreover, previous literature in the sociology
ﬁeld [33]–[35] declare that if two users are connected by an
embedded link then they will more likely trust each other
and have increased conﬁdence in their relations.
We applied those two measures on our network to detect
and understand the potential level of trust between the users
in the Facebook activist group. The results showed that for
neighbourhood overlap and edge embeddedness, the highest
scoring links were between User 20 and User 211, User 20
and User 92, and User 92 and User 211, respectively. These
three links form a triangle between the three users which







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5. User-Post bipartite graph for the FB-AG group. Users are visualized as white nodes where the size represent how active the user is. Posts are
coloured (red, green, blue) based on the sentiment analysis of the text (negative, positive, neutral, respectively).
links in the graph scored zero in both measures, which sug-
gests that they are local bridges in the graph [32]. According
to previous studies that focused on understanding social
collective behaviour, local bridges are considered powerful
in spreading awareness and general information. However,
they are not as effective in spreading strong behaviour such
as political or protesting movements [36]. This means that in
the FB-AG network, if one of the three users (User 20, User
211, User 92) calls for a protest or a movement then it is
more likely that the other two users will join the movement.
Another important measure to study is edge betweenness
centrality, which computes the degree to which an edge
makes other connections possible. The results showed that
the following links had the highest betweenness measure in
the graph: User 33 and User 18, User 18 and User 74, User
74 and User 156, User 209 and User 74, and User 74 and
User 181. This means that those users relations facilitate
the ﬂow of information within the network. Moreover, they
act as bridges to connect different communities of highly
interconnected people. Using this information, law enforce-
ment can disrupt the network and stop a riot for example by
targeting these particular links.
B. Sentiment Analysis
Now that we have an understanding of the most inﬂuential
users in the network, we construct a second graph from
the dataset which is more focused on analysing user-to-post
relationship. We generate a bipartite graph biG = (U, V,E)
consisting of two node sets (U and V ), and an edge set E
which contains the edges of the graph. The two sets U and V
represent two types of nodes, Users and Posts, respectively.
An edge e between a given user u and a post p is formed,
if user u created the post p. We will refer to this graph as
the user-post graph.
Figure 5 shows the bipartite User-Post graph for FB-AG
group. The Users are represented by a white colour while
Posts are presented in either blue, red, or green colours. The
colour code for the nodes in the Posts set represents the result
of sentiment analysis on the posts’ text. We used automated
tools to calculate the sentiment score for each post and
classify it as a negative, positive, or neutral sentiment [37]. A
post is assigned a negative sentiment if it contains aggressive
975
language, or calls for protests and is presented in a red
colour. A post with a positive sentiment is one that contains
positive and encouraging text, and is depicted by green
colour. Finally, a post is assigned a neutral sentiment if it
contains generic content such as questions, URLs, images,
etc. and it is depicted by blue colour. The size of the nodes in
the Users set represent how active the user is in the network
(i.e., the Out Degree). On the other hand, the size of the
nodes in the Posts set represent the total number of likes,
comments, and shares that post received divided by the total
number of group members. We will refer to this measure as
the post-engagement level.
We can see from the User-Post graph in Figure 5 that there
are ten main active hubs in the group. The top three most
active users are User 74, User 20, and User 33. User 74 has
mostly neutral sentiment posts (i.e., has neutral inﬂuence on
the group), while User 20 and User 33 usually post negative
sentiment posts (i.e., have negative inﬂuence). A summary
of the top ten users is presented in Table III along with
the distribution of posts’ sentiments. This ﬁnding supports
our previous conclusion from the analysis on the Comments
Network that User 74 and User 33 are the leaders of the
group. It also adds that User 33 is more inclined to organise
or lead a protest with User 20, while User 74 role is more
related to answering questions or posting neutral content that
can be related to raising awareness to the group’s cause.
Table III
USER-POST BIPARTITE GRAPH: 10 MOST ACTIVE USERS
Number of Nodes: 944 , Number of Edges: 670
User ID Out Degree Negative Sentiment Positive Sentiment Neutral Sentiment
User 20 27 13 5 9
User 32 13 2 1 10
User 33 25 15 1 9
User 37 20 7 3 10
User 74 32 8 4 20
User 165 18 9 2 7
User 172 20 5 4 11
User 179 10 4 1 5
User 224 19 0 2 17
User 234 11 3 3 5
C. Time Analysis
In this section, we perform a temporal analysis of the
network’s posting and commenting structure. This analysis
will aid in identifying hidden activity patterns in the dataset.
Figure 6 shows the group posting activity levels per day. On
average, the group posts around 10 posts everyday. Some
days had zero posting activity, while other days had a spike
in the number of posts to a maximum of 56. It is important
to mention here that even though some days had zero posts
this does not mean that the group was completely in active.
In fact, this means that no new posts were created, but a like
or a share action of an existing post may have occurred.
As shown in the graph in Figure 6, there were three time
periods that had an increased activity level with the highest
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being in around May 7th. This is likely to be correlated
with the fact that on this particular day there was the
United Kingdom general election, which is of interest to
this particular activist group as it would have an impact on
their cause. Additionally, the spike occurring in March 20
coincides with a call for a national day of action called for
by other activist groups who share the same interest.
Moreover, there is a clear pattern in the increase and
decrease of the group activity levels across the three-month
period. Therefore, we wanted to investigate who are the users
who post just before the spikes in the activity occur. This
might give us insight into identifying inﬂuential users, for
instance if there are a speciﬁc group of people who tend
to always post before a spike in the activity occurs. We
identiﬁed three main dates in each month where the activity
was at its maximum level (March 20, April 8, and May 7).
Then, we gathered all users who posted during the three
previous days. Our assumption here is that the three days
leading up to each peak may serve as the reason for the
spikes. Our results showed that User 74 and User 37 were
consistently active before most spikes. This supports our
previous results regarding the high inﬂuence of User 74, and
allows us to infer that User 37 has a similar high inﬂuence.
VI. RESULTS VALIDATION AND DISCUSSION
In the previous section we used several SNA metrics,
sentiment and temporal analysis to understand and identify
the most inﬂuential people in a group of organised activists.
Our results from each type of analysis yielded a set of users
as most inﬂuential. Some of these results overlapped, which
indicates that the identiﬁed users possess a strong inﬂuence
over the group. In such research, it is usually difﬁcult to get
access to the ground truth in order to validate the results. In
our case, we were able to work with a security consultancy
company to acquire the ground truth about the activist group
since they had more comprehensive intelligence information
about them. Their ground truth was based on monitoring the
group activities online as well as ofﬂine information.
They have identiﬁed seven users as being the most inﬂu-
ential in the group. By comparing our results to the ground
truth we ﬁnd that through our analysis we were able to
976
identify ﬁve (User 74, User 33, User 20, User 37, and User
179) of those seven users. The remaining two users did
not have an active presence in our dataset which explains
why they were not ﬂagged in our analysis. Additionally,
through our analysis we identiﬁed in total eight important
links, of these we found a strong relation between User 20
(one of the inﬂuential members), and User 211 and User
92. Although the latter two users were not ﬂagged in our
analysis as inﬂuential, their strong connection to User 20
could be grounds for an increased importance.
In our study, we were able to understand the dynamics
of interactions between users in the group by applying SNA
metrics, such as network diameter, average paths length, and
degree centrality. Moreover, we identiﬁed the key-players in
the group by using different centrality measures (DegCent,
BetCent, EigenCent) and tie strength analysis (Neighbour-
hood overlap, Embeddedness, Edge Betweenness). Through
our analysis, we found that the most active users are not
necessarily the most inﬂuential. Additionally, by applying
sentiment analysis on users’ posts we were able to identify
which users have positive and negative inﬂuence on the
group. This can help law enforcement to focus on monitoring
key users with negative inﬂuence on the group to be able to
predict future hostile protests.
Furthermore, we were able to identify sub-communities
in the activist group as well as predict trust relation and tie
strength between members through several SNA methods.
Additionally, we performed time analysis that showed sev-
eral increases and decreases in the group posting activity
levels. Some of these increases coincide with multiple real-
life events such as UK general elections, and calls for
national day of action and protests.
It is important to acknowledge here that the size of
our dataset is relatively small, which makes it difﬁcult to
generalise the ﬁndings. Thus, further analysis is needed on
larger datasets that cover longer periods of time. We are
currently pursuing this for our next line of research.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we explored the use of different SNA
methods in order to identify key and inﬂuential individu-
als within online activist groups. Since online social net-
works have gained increased popularity, they have been
adopted by several organised groups as a medium for fast
communication and wide spread of their messages. This
gives us, the research community, a chance to analyse the
behaviour of these groups. We analysed the dynamics of
the interactions in a Facebook activist group using SNA
and time-analysis techniques. This allowed us to identify
the most active and most inﬂuential members. Additionally,
we adopted sentiment analysis to identify users with both
positive and negative inﬂuences on the group. Trust relations
were investigated using link analysis methods. We validated
our results against a ground truth, which showed that we
were able to identify the main inﬂuential people based on
structural properties of their online behaviour.
For our future work, we aim to evaluate our methods in a
more extensive study with a larger sample collected over a
longer period of time. Additionally, we aim to compare the
behaviour of similar groups across different social media
e.g., Facebook and Twitter. This may help in identifying
additional relations between members. Similarly, we aim
to compare the interaction-based relations to the actual
social (friendship) relations of the users. This may allow
us to identify hidden friendships, where users try to cover
their friendship by not creating a direct link between them.
This type of analysis is valuable to the ﬁeld of cybercrime
investigation, particular in combination with work such
as [38], [39], where we do not have enough information
about the group hierarchy, however, may have access to their
communication.
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